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1) Introduction 
Corporate power in Britain is multifaceted, multilayered, and geographically structured. 
In contrast to the classic rise of the capitalist class, the established landed aristocracy 
was not overthrown in Britain but became embedded in its ascendancy, an articulation 
strongly marking institutional forms of power to this day (Anderson 1964). The 
industrial revolution that drove the accumulation of national wealth in 19th century 
Britain had had its catalyst in the wealth of international trade and plunder, and in turn 
was quickly followed by international corporate expansion. British capital dominated 
international investment through to the Second World War and today still accounts for 
the world’s second largest of overseas direct investment stock (Dunning and Archer 
1987, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2011). So the British 
corporate elite are intimately structured by a complex of national and transnational 
influences. 
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Periodic attempts to delve into the growing documentary archive of elite relationships in 
Britain have barely pierced the outer layers of the structures of corporate elite cohesion, 
however. The availability of data and the potentially strategic importance of a director’s 
role has led attention primarily towards interlocking directorships (Aaronovitch 1956, 
Useem 1984, Windolf 2002), while the mining of biographical databases provides an 
entry-point into elite schools, clubs and social circles (Sampson 1962). But these are 
only limited components of the taxonomy of multiple layers of inter-organisational 
bonds proposed by Scott and Griff (1984) as constituting elite cohesion, let alone 
extended to  national and transnational dimensions (see Table 1).  
[Table 1 about here] 
This paper takes a modest taxonomic step through these layers, reviewing and extending 
Scott’s periodic studies of British director interlocks, temporarily and methodologically, 
then considering the pattern of interlocks in the context of transnational influences on 
the British economy. 
2) Studies of the British corporate elite 
There is a rich vein of historical analysis of the development of British capitalism, 
sifting archives to meticulously document the rise of a wide variety of industries and the 
large firms that have come to dominate them. While much of this research initially 
considered the relatively slow growth of British corporate capitalism after pioneering 
industrialisation, as compared to the US and Germany, a re-examination from the 1970s 
highlighted the early and persistent internationalisation of British industrial firms.  
British merchant houses, originally establishing offshore agencies to facilitate 
international trade, diversified from the early 19th century into episodic banking, 
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construction, plantations and manufacturing; Jardine Matheson and P&O originate from 
this time. Specialist companies followed the merchants offshore to finance and insure 
trade. Barings and Pheonix Insurance established US branches in the early 1800s While 
the pioneers of industrial expansion abroad were US, British firms followed from the 
1860s with textile and steel manufacturers establishing subsidiaries in the rapidly 
growing, but protected, US market; by 1914, 14 of the 100 largest British 
manufacturing firms had overseas operations (Stopford and Turner 1985).  In all, British 
overseas assets increased rapidly in the second half of the 19th century, from £1.1 billion 
in 1850 to £5 billion in 1874 and £11 billion in 1900, 45 per cent of the latter 
comprising direct investments. Total overseas assets equalled one third of national 
wealth and accounted for half of the world’s investment stock. British capital dominated 
international investment through to the Second World War, accounting for 40 per cent 
of the total in 1939 and today still accounts for the world’s second largest of overseas 
direct investment stock (Barratt Brown 1974, Corley 1994, Dunning and Archer 1987, 
Edelstein 2003, Jones 1988, Nicholas 1983, United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development 2011).  
While the historical research on large firms has been largely descriptive, at times it has 
resonated with the delineation of articulated structures of power, most notably 
synthesised around the concept of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’(Cain and Hopkins 2001). 
This highlights the clubbish interconnections among the landed aristocracy and the City 
of London as critical to the funding of rapid capitalist expansion, both as a source of 
strength and myopic weakness. Ingram (1984), for example, attributes British post-war 
industrial decline to the disproportionate political power of the City, echoed in recent 
commentary on the 2008 financial crisis. 
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Attempts to delineate the corporate elite more systematically have predominantly 
centred on the social relationships formed when a member of a board of directors of 
simultaneously serves on the board of directors of another company. These multiple 
directorships constitute social relations between the boards, described as interlocks, and 
provide a potential conduit for the transfer of strategically valuable information among a 
group of linked firms. From a resource-based view of business behaviour, such 
connections are especially valuable for firms facing uncertainty, providing opportunities 
to reduce uncertainty with specific knowledge about competitors’ plans, debtors’ 
intentions, or greater knowledge of the business environment in general. 
The suggestion that interlocks provide strategically important information channels is 
supported by the nationally distinctive patterns of director interlocking, with the UK and 
US characterised by low rates of interlocking (Carroll and Fennema 2002, Stokman, et 
al. 1985, Windolf 2002). However, while this may appear to relate to the more market-
oriented capital funding in these countries (Scott 1991), there is little explicit 
relationship between funding requirements and interlocking other than as a response to 
financial difficulties (Mizruchi and Stearns 1988). The trend may simply reflect 
differences in the number of large, domestic or financial firms, and those with large 
minority shareholders, each of which is associated with interlocking (Carroll and 
Alexander 1999, Dooley 1969, Ornstein 1984). At the same time, while there has been 
little evidence of collusive behaviour arising from these communication channels, 
interlocks have been associated with the diffusion of business practices, including 
quality management, takeover defences and political donations (Bond 2004, Mizruchi 
1996).  
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Possibly most significantly, interlocks appear to provide a general ‘scan’ of the business 
environment, important to strategic decision-making (Useem 1984). Generalising the 
resource-based approach, firms may use this scanning capacity to reduce uncertainty in 
industries or markets where information is less transparent. Financial institutions might 
be expected to have larger boards and thus greater scanning capacity because of the 
opacity of the affairs of borrowers. Likewise, foreign-owned firms operating in a less 
familiar business environment and firms dependent on government concessions. 
Scott and Griff (1984) note how director interlocks represented only one of a multiple 
set of bonds that structured corporate elite cohesion, each providing a channel for 
exchanges and flows of money, materials and information (see Figure 1). Scott (1986) 
commences the more extensive investigation demanded by this taxonomy by 
supplementing director interlock studies with a consideration of ownership type, 
introducing the useful concept of ownership by a ‘constellation of interests’ (Nyman 
and Silberston 1978). Such shareholdings tend to be held by institutional investors, 
insurance companies and fund managers displacing family ownership between 1936 and 
1951. However, in 1976, 21% of firms remained controlled by an entrepreneurial 
interest, and 20% by a family, while 14% of firms had family involvement in a 
constellation of interests. 
Later, Scott  (1991) broadly scopes the articulation of the various levels of elite 
cohesion with an account of membership of social groups (see also Francis 1980, Lisle-
Williams 1984). Somewhat more systematically, albeit with a limited sample, Brayshay, 
Cleary and Selwood (2007) examine the geographical location, school origins and club 
membership of directors of 12 prominent highly internationalised UK trading and 
banking firms in 1900 and 1930. They find the geographic distribution of directors 
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related to the geographic pattern of each firm’s commercial activity and the persistence 
of both this geographic distribution and corporate connections with particular social 
clubs over the 30 year period. 
A systematic examination of the British corporate elite, then, requires analysis of a set 
of inter-organisational relationships, embracing commercial, capital and personal 
relations. Data availability steers investigation towards director interlocks and 
shareholding relationships in the first instance, as pioneered in the UK case by Scott. 
But given the relatively well-documented international interaction of UK firms, it seems 
a feasible extension of Scott’s work to consider the transnational influences on these 
drivers of elite cohesion. 
 
3) Methods and data 
A comparative cross-sectional approach is used to examine the evolution of the 
structure of British director interlocks over the last century. Scott’s studies of the 
interlock structure in 1904, 1938 and 1976 (largely reported in Scott and Griff 1984) are 
supplemented by original studies of the interlock structure in 2006 and 2009, before and 
after the 2007-8 financial crisis. Consistent sampling and methodologies were 
employed, as much as could be ascertained from the published accounts. Metrics on the 
structure of the interlock network provided by Scott were sufficient for systematic 
comparison at all five time-points.  
For the supplementary 2006 and 2009 cross-sections, data on directors were drawn from 
the Bureau van Dyke Orbis database for the 250 largest UK firms by revenue. Because 
this listing included holding as well as operational companies, this was reviewed, 
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excluding direct subsidiaries and operational companies where directors and revenues 
were substantially the same as the holding company, a method implicit in Scott’s work.i 
Also excluded were limited liability partnerships, the large accounting firms whose 
many partners were formally recorded as directors.  
For comparison with Scott’s earlier findings, descriptive statistics were drawn for each 
cross-section, using UCINET 6.0 (Borgatti, et al. 2002), including a component analysis 
and a listing of the ten most central firms each year, in terms of degree centrality. 
Alternative measures of centrality, such as betweenness, closeness and eigenvector 
centrality were found by Scott and Griff (1984) to be highly correlated. 
Following the comparison of network metrics across the five-cross sections, a listing of 
the ten most central firms for each period provides the basis for an historical 
consideration of the evolution of the director network. Scott’s approach, which 
reviewed the industrial basis of the most central firms against an account of the 
economic structure at the time, is extended to consider transnational influences at each 
period. 
In Scott’s work, the relationships formed between firms by sharing a common director 
is considered to be a network comprising the firms alone, a 1-mode firm-to-firm 
network among a standard number of firms (250). However, as the relationships 
between firms are actually constituted by firm-director-firm linkages, the network is 
actually more complex, larger, and the network size varies with the number of directors 
involved. This complexity and richness in the network structure is lost when the 
network is represented solely in 1-mode terms. 
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As discussed by Borgatti and Everett (1997),  it is important to account for the two-
mode nature of this data when normalising for network size. In Figure 1, the normalised 
degree centrality of A in 1-mode terms, the proportion of the maximum possible degree, 
is 2/(4-1) = 0.67. But in 2-mode terms, the maximum possible degree is given by the 
total nodes in the other mode, so the normalised degree of A is 2/4 = 0.50.  Similar 
arguments are given by  Borgatti and Everett (1997) for betweenness, closeness and 
eigenvector centrality. Likewise, network density needs to account for the 2-mode 
nature of the data. One-mode directed data has a maximum of n(n-1) ties and undirected 
ties half of this, whereas  in 2-mode data again the maximum ties is given by the total 
nodes in each other mode,  n1.n2 for directed data and 2(n1.n2) for directed data. As a 
result of these considerations, a further centrality analysis was undertaken of the 2006 
and 2009 data, listing the ten largest firms in terms of 2-mode degree, betweenness and 
closeness centrality. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Finally, a more detailed examination of the effects of transnational influences on the 
director interlock structure in 2006 and 2010 was undertaken by means of a regression 
analysis. The dependent variable in each case was the degree centrality and closeness 
centrality of each firm; a visual inspection of the network suggested betweenness was 
subsumed by the latter. These were compared to a variety of indicators of financial 
performance, industry and transnationality. Financial indicators, found significant in 
other interlock studies, comprised Log Revenue, Return on Shareholders’ Funds, Return 
on Capital Employed, Price Earnings Ratio and Solvency (Cronin and Popov 2005, 
Dooley 1969, Fligstein and Brantley 1992, Mizruchi and Stearns 1988, Ong, et al. 
2003). The industry indicator used was the one-digit NACE code (as an ordinal range). 
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Indicators of transnational integration comprised the percentage of UK sales, the 
percentage of directors resident outside the UK and whether the firm was foreign owned 
or not. These were derived predominantly from the Orbis geographic segment sales 
category, supplemented by company reports. In some cases for the UK sales percentage, 
the UK was not separately identified as a geographic segment, in which case the 
smallest next aggregation, typically Europe, was used. 
The interdependent nature of network data renders it unsuitable for OLS regression as 
the interdependencies violate the assumptions of independence of variables and their 
normal distribution central to the OLS method, typically strongly overstating the 
statistical significance of correlations. Fortunately, the Multiple Regression Quadratic 
Assignment Procedure (MRQAP) regression technique, a modified OLS approach  
available in UCINET 6.0, provides a means of regressing interdependent data  In lieu of 
a normal distribution, this uses a comparison with a large number of random 
permutations in the values associated with each node to test the significance of the 
observed values (Dekker, et al. 2007).  
For the MRQAP procedure, a  matrix was created for each variable, by taking the 
similarity or difference in the metric for each pair of nodes. These matrices were then 
compared to each other and to the differences in the dependent variable. The following 
model was used:  
(1) Δ Centrality = α +  β1 Δ Log(Revenue) + β2 Δ ROSF + β3 Δ ROCE + β4 Δ PER 
+ β5 ΔSolvency + β6 Δ NACE + β7 Δ UK Sales percent + β8 Δ Foreign 
Director percent  + β8 Δ Foreign-owned + μ 
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4) Findings  
Network statistics of the director interlocks among the largest UK firms at the five time-
points are presented in Table 2. There is remarkable stability in the number of directors 
and directors per board, and interlocks per interlocked firm across the century. But the 
number of directors serving on multiple boards, interlocked firms, firms in the largest 
component, number of strong components and thus the density of the network is 
considerably reduced. Within these general trends, the density of interlocks firms, 
indicated by multiple directors, total interlocks, firms interlocked, interlocks per 
interlocked firm, density, number of firms in the largest component and number of firms 
in the largest strong component increased in the first half of the twentieth century then 
declined thereafter. Between 1938 and 1976 there was an increase in the number of 
directors and consequently directors per board, but these were not as densely 
interlocked with the rest of the top 250 or its core. Interlocking declined further after 
1976 on all counts except interlocks per interlocked firm, suggesting a consolidation of 
interlocks around a core. The 2008 global financial crisis appears to have had little 
effect on board size or overall density but there was a noticeable increase in multiple, 
and thus total, interlocks, firms interlocked and firms in the largest component. At the 
same time, the core of the network weakened, with an increase in the number of 
components but a decrease in the number of firms in the largest strong component.ii  
[Table 2 about here] 
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Scott found the largest strong component in 1904 comprising 17 major family-
connected merchant and clearing banks in the City with no strong links with industry. 
The 13 London clearing banks had some interlocks with no more than 9 industrial firms. 
By 1938, the largest strong component had grown to 63 firms, still centred on the City 
family-based merchant banks but with connections into regionally-based heavy 
industry, which he described as “the characteristic pattern of British finance capital” 
(Scott 2003, 165). By 1976, the regional structure had been diffused by widespread 
small-shareholdings throughout the national economy by large financial institutions 
such as insurance firms and pension funds and the City firms were divided among 
different components. But the banks remained central to the interlocking director 
network. Following the financial deregulation of 1986 and increased foreign ownership, 
the interlock structure dissipated, with lower density, fewer bank interlocks and fewer 
financial-industry links by 1992. 
While comparative data is not available for the first three periods, international 
dimensions of the network are evident from an analysis of the nationality of directors 
(see Table 3). A third of directors of the top 250 UK-registered firms in both 2006 and 
2010 were resident outside the UK. These were drawn predominantly from Europe and 
North America, although perhaps surprisingly few from Asia, given the rapid economic 
growth of that region. Further disaggregation of the North American total combined 
with Australasia points to the continuing salience of the former British dominions in the 
UK’s international business operations. 
[Table 3 about here] 
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Table 4 presents the ten most central firms in terms of degree centrality at each time-
point. The distribution suggests an industrial shift in the centre of the interlock network 
from railways in 1904 to banking and oil in 1938 to banking in 1976 and banking and 
consumer goods in 2006. Scott found the largest strong component in 1904 comprising 
17 major family-connected merchant and clearing banks in the City with no strong links 
with industry. The 13 London clearing banks had some interlocks with no more than 9 
industrial firms. By 1938, the largest strong component had grown to 63 firms, still 
centred on the City family-based merchant banks but with connections into regionally-
based heavy industry, which he described as “the characteristic pattern of British 
finance capital” (Scott 2003, 165). By 1976, the regional structure had been diffused by 
widespread small-shareholdings throughout the national economy by large financial 
institutions such as insurance firms and pension funds and the City firms were divided 
among different components. But the banks remained central to the interlocking director 
network. Following the financial deregulation of 1986 and increased foreign ownership, 
the interlock structure dissipated, with lower density, fewer bank interlocks and fewer 
financial-industry links by 1992. Drawing on historical research it is possible to 
highlight transnational influences at each time-point, with firms maintaining operational 
subsidiaries overseas highlighted in bold. An internationalisation of the core of the 
network is evident, led by banking and oil, then generalised by the 2006-2010 period.  
[Table 4 about here] 
While the various measures of centrality are highly correlated in one-mode company-
company terms, when the relationships among the intermediary directors themselves are 
considered, that is two-mode company-director-company relations, the centrality 
metrics diverge. Degree centrality is weakly associated with closeness and betweenness 
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centrality is negatively (r = 0.42 and 0.51 in 2006; r = 0.29 and 0.39 in 2010) though the 
latter two are strongly correlated (r = 0.74; 0.76). The 2006 and 2010 columns of Table 
3 illustrate the divergence of the two-mode centrality measures from one-mode degree 
centrality, with three firms central in one-mode terms not central in two-mode terms and 
only two firms being on the list by virtue of their two-mode degree centrality. Rather 
the one-mode degree centrality appears to be a weak and imprecise proxy for the 
correlation of two-mode betweenness and closeness. 
Whereas the one-mode measure of degree centrality draws attention to banks and 
consumer goods firms, in the two-mode measure international banks and resources 
firms are more prominent (see Table 5). This is via their connections to a network of 
well-connected directors, which are reduced to single firm-to firm relationships when 
translated to one-mode data.  There is also considerable disruption to the top-ten in two-
mode degree terms from the 2008 financial crisis, with only three survivors.  Consumer 
goods firms are more prominent in the two-mode betweenness and closeness rankings, 
which also see a little more survival beyond the financial crisis. In general, the survivors 
tend to move from prominence in terms of degree centrality towards prominence in 
betweenness and closeness centrality, suggesting a consolidation of the core in the wake 
of the crisis. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Table 6 presents the results of the regression analysis of the 2006 and 2010 data. In both 
years, degree centrality was associated with revenue and the proportion of foreign 
directors, that is, larger firms and those with a higher proportion of foreign directors 
tended to have a larger number of interlocks. In 2010, degree centrality was also 
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associated with industry, firms with higher NACE codes, that is towards finance, having 
more interlocks.  
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Closeness centrality was also associated with revenue in both years. However, in 2006, 
closeness was also negatively associated with UK sales, that is, firms with a greater 
proportion of overseas sales were more likely to be closer to all other firms in the 
director interlock network. In 2010, however, this was not evident and it was the more 
solvent and domestically-owned firms that had the greatest closeness centrality. There 
were no significant relationships with any other financial ratio tested. 
5) Discussion 
Scott’s pioneering research relating the director interlock structure to the changing 
sectoral and geographic characteristics of the UK economy is supported by the evident 
internationalisation of the interlock network in the 21st century. Large, domestically-
owned firms with transnational reach, largely in the banking and resource industries, 
dominate the centre of the interlock network. A significant minority of the directors of 
these firms are drawn from overseas but this is consistent with uncertainty avoidance by 
internationalising firms. Further, a number of domestically-oriented consumer goods 
firms remain central. 
While Scott and Griff (1984) detected a concentration of the corporate elite to 1976, as 
mutual funds and banks displaced merchant family firms in ownership of the top 250 
firms, the century-long trend is towards dissipation of power, with the 
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internationalisation of the economy. While board size and interlocks per interlocked 
firm is surprisingly continuous, multiple interlocking and the large strong components 
have diminished. The increased multiple interlocking by larger financial firms and those 
with greater solvency following the global financial crisis, however, is consistent with 
the expectations of resource dependency theory, that firms seek to reduce uncertainty by 
increasing interlocking. This suggests a defensive reaction by a domestically-based 
fraction of the corporate elite, with disaggregation of the one-mode measures of 
centrality showing this group centrally close. 
Consistent with Useem’s notion of a corporate ‘scan’ and generalised resource 
dependency approaches, director interlocking has evolved as a strategic source of 
information where uncertainty is high. This generated a tight core where information 
circulated in merchant-families, a more extensive network as financial institutions 
became more central to ownership and national markets and financial risks became 
more generalised, then more diffuse as the corporate elite in general internationalised 
and overseas information became more important. That these are not invariable trends 
can be seen in the defensive interlocking associated with the immediate risks arising 
from the 2008 global financial crisis. 
In sum, the pattern of director interlocking within the UK corporate elite over the last 
century reflects the transition of the economy from family-based merchant capitalism to 
regionally-based industrialism then international banking and resources. But this does 
not amount to a unilateral dissolution of the national economy into a global capitalism. 
Rather, the internationalisation of the largest firms remains strongly nationally based, 
domestically-owned, internationalisation of the directorate associated with external 
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expansion and with a sizeable component comprising domestically-oriented consumer 
goods providers. 
 
 
 
6) Conclusion 
The multilayered nature of UK corporate power is evident in this examination of the 
changing articulation of director interlocking and transnational influences over the last 
century. British capitalism has been intrinsically structured by national and transnational 
processes from its start and the expansion of its nexus of activity from the national to 
global markets elides a complex articulation of corporate power that can be too readily 
interpreted as a diminution of national interests. 
In the shadow of the United States, European Union, Japan and China, British capital 
remains the world’s second largest overseas investor, with banking and resources firms 
at the heart of the global economy. Scrutiny of the structures of director interlocking 
over the century reveals a persistent national core among the UK corporate elite, not 
noticeably diminished by the shifts in the sectoral or geographical focus of economic 
activity.  
The salience of Useem’s corporate scan and generalised resource dependency models in 
explaining particular patterns of director interlocking is evident. While the search for 
oligarchic groupings amongst the corporate elite and direct firm-firm resource-exchange 
activities in various studies has been elusive, the value of the more generalised 
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information seeking and uncertainty avoidance to the coherence of the corporate elite 
should not be underestimated.  
 
 
 
 
Table 8.1. Inter-organisational bonds 
Relationship National Transnational 
Capital Relations   
Shareholding   
Bank credit   
Commercial Relations   
Trade   
Joint-ventures and consortia   
Parent-subsidiary   
Business services    
Personal Relations   
Director interlocks   
Director friendships    
Director kinship   
Social/political organisations   
 
Source: Adapted from Scott and Griff (1984) 
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Table 8.2. Characteristics of director interlocks among 250 largest UK 
companies 
 1904 1938 1976 2006 2010 
Directors 2204 2173 2682 2069 2061 
Directors per board 8.8 8.7 10.7 8.3 8.2 
Multiple directors 303 329 282 155 183 
Total interlocks (incl. multiple) 510 809 591 388 454 
Interlocks between firms 401 578 542 346 387 
Firms interlocked 197 201 189 119 145 
Interlocks per interlocked firm  2.6 4.0 3.1 3.3 3.1 
Density (%) 1.3 1.9 1.7 0.6 0.7 
Distinct components** 9 4 3 1 4 
Firms in the largest component 177 194 185 105 113 
Strong components* 24 n.d. 17 1 2 
Firms in the largest strong component 17 63 13 6 3 
* Involving multiple ties between firms 
** 3 nodes or more 
Strong components with 3 or more members 2006: 
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Table 8.3. Nationality of directors of UK 250 largest companies 
 2010 
Africa 27 1% 
Australasia 35 2% 
Asia 57 3% 
Europe 266 13% 
North America 172 8% 
UK 1405 68% 
Other 28 1% 
No data 71 4% 
Total 2061  
 
Note. There was no difference in distribution if measured in terms of unique directors 
or total directorships. 
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Table 8.4. UK companies with the greatest degree centrality 1904-2010 
(1-mode) 
1904   1938   1976   2006  2010  
Nth Br. & 
Merc 
18  Lloyds Bank 33  Lloyds Bank 28  Standard 
Chartered 
(B, C) 
11 National 
Grid 
(B, C) 
11 
LNW 
Railway 
17  Midland 
Bank 
27  Bank of 
England 
26  Compass 
group 
10 Anglo 
American 
(D, B, C) 
10 
Royal 
Exchange 
14  LMS 
Railway 
26  Midland 
Bank 
21  Lloyds 
TSB Bank 
(B, C) 
10 Reckitt 
Benckiser 
(B, C) 
9 
Bank of 
England 
13  Gt Western 
Rly 
24  BP 19  Unilever 
(B, C) 
9 Marks 
and 
Spencer  
(B, C) 
7 
Nth Eastern 
Rly 
13  Shell 21  Barclays 
Bank 
18  BP  
(D, C) 
8 Royal 
Bank of 
Scotland 
7 
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Dunderland 
Iron 
12  Bank of 
England 
21  Commercial 
Union 
18  Rolls-
Royce 
8 Tesco (C) 7 
GKN 11  Sun 
Insurance 
19  Nat 
Westminster 
Bank 
18  BUPA (C) 7 WM 
Morrison 
7 
Forth 
Bridge Rly 
11  LNE 
Railway 
18  Finance for 
Industry 
17  Wolseley  7 BT 6 
Union of L 
& S Bank 
11  Westminster 
Bank 
18  Delta Metal 16  Barclays 
(D, B) 
7 HSBC  
(D, B, C) 
6 
GN & 
Piccadilly 
11  Venezuelan 
Oil 
17  Hill Samuel 16  Tomkins 
(B) 
7 Lloyds 
Banking 
(B) 
6 
Source: Adapted from Scott and Griff (1984): 155 
Note: 2006, 2010 – main component of 1-mode network 
Bold – Has operational subsidiaries overseas 
(D)  In top-ten in terms of 2-mode degree centrality 
(B) In top-ten in terms of 2-mode betweenness centrality 
(C) In top-ten in terms of 2-mode closeness centrality 
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Table 8.5. UK companies - Ranking by two-mode network centrality 2006-2010 
 
 Degree 
2006 
Between-
ness 
2006 
Close-
ness 
2006 
Degree 
2010 
Between-
ness 
2010 
Close-
ness 
2010 
Morgan Stanley 
International 
1 
     
Camelot Group 2      
HSBC Holdings 3   3 8 9 
Barclays 4 5     
BP 5 7 4   7 
British Sky Broadcasting 6     10 
Rio Tinto 7   9   
Unilever 8 9 3    
Anglo American 9   6 1 1 
BAE Systems 10      
Lloyds TSB Bank  1 1  5  
Marks and Spencer  2 6  3 4 
Standard Chartered  3 2 7   
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Tomkins  4     
Cadbury Schweppes  6 8    
National Grid  8   2 3 
Pearson  10 5  10 6 
BUPA   7    
Tesco   9  6 2 
LogicaCMG   10    
Sabmiller    1   
Carnival    2   
United Company Rusal    4   
Tui Travel    5   
Prudential    8   
John Wood Group    10   
Reckitt Benckiser     4 8 
IMI     7  
Smiths Group     9 5 
 
Bold – member of top-ten in both periods  
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Table 8.6. Regression results - MRQAP 
Standardised 
Coefficients Degree 2006 Closeness 2006 Degree 2010 Closeness 2010 
UK sales percent 0. 0120  -0.1651 * -0.0003  -0.0803  
Foreign owned -0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0000 * 
Directors foreign percent 0.1455 * -0.0034  0.2674 * -0.0267  
Log Revenue 0.4331 *** 0.4034 *** 0.3112 ** 0.4014 *** 
NACE -0.0210  0.1137  0.1288 * 0.0332  
Price Earnings Ratio -0.0397  -0.0573  -0.0783  -0.0264  
ROCE 0.0560  -0.0120  0.0254  0.0768  
ROSF -0.0163  0.0394  -0.0261  -0.0160  
Solvency -0.0120  -0.0222  0.0380  0.1437 * 
R-square 0.261  0.214  0.229  0.212  
Adj. R-square 0.261  0.213  0.228  0.212  
Probability 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
Observations 10920  10920  12656  12656  
Permutations 2000  2000  2000  2000  
Missing  values 3948  3948  1526  1526  
 
*p < 0.1; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Figure 8.1. Data loss in transformation of 2-mode to 1-mode data 
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i This was not universally applied in the earlier studies, however. One of the 1938 ten 
most central companies, Venezuela Oil, was actually a subsidiary of Shell, another on 
the top-ten list (Bain and Read 1976). 
ii There is little overlap between the one strong components in 2006 and the two in 
2010, with only National Grid PLC being present in both. 
                                                 
